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PLAINTIFF'S CONDUCT IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY
ACTIONS: COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE,
AUTOMATIC DIVISION AND MULTIPLE PARTIES
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN*

T

HE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT of products liability
law in the last generation has had a large impact upon many
firms that once enjoyed a broad immunity from the rigors of tort
law. Drug manufacturers, who in bygone years had little to fear if
their products were properly formulated and prepared, now face
the onslaught of actions based upon their failure to supply full
and adequate warnings to consumer or physician, as the case may
be. Machine tool manufacturers, who were once protected by an
arsenal of defenses, are now exposed to massive liability even with
respect to products manufactured and marketed years before the
recent growth in products liability law. Automobile manufacturers
are no longer responsible only for the occasional miscarriage
attributable to construction defects, but must also respond to a
new class of design defect actions based upon the alleged uncrashworthiness of the vehicle in question. Nor have airplane manufacturers, not to mention their component part suppliers, designers
and distributors, been able to stand aloof from the recent explosion in products liability law.
In some respects, this vast proliferation of products liability
actions has resulted in much specialization within the bar. The
expertise needed to make out a duty-to-warn case against a pharmaceutical house is very different from that relevant to a design defect
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case against a machine tool manufacturer or an uncrashworthiness
case against an automobile or airplane manufacturer. Yet, a breakdown of subject matter by product line can only obscure some
essential features that unite apparently disparate causes of action.
Long ago in his article, The Path of Law, Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., wrote of the vagaries of jurisprudential attitudes:
There is a story of a Vermont justice of the peace before whom a
suit was brought by one farmer against another for breaking a
chum. The justice took time to consider, and then said that he
had looked through the statutes and could find nothing about
churns, and gave judgment for the defendant. The same state of
mind is shown in all our common digests and text-books. Applications of rudimentary rules of contract or tort are tucked away
under the head of Railroads or Telegraphs or go to swell treatises
on historical subdivisions, such as Shipping or Equity, or are
gathered under an arbitrary title which is thought likely to appeal
to the practical mind, such as Mercantile Law.!
The dangers which Holmes articulates are especially evident in
the treatment of plaintiff's conduct in products liability actions.'
No matter what the nature and structure of the product, no matter
what the theory of the underlying cause of action, there is one
issue which can be litigated in most, if not all, products liability
actions. That question is whether the plaintiff's misconduct-even
conduct not amounting to a deliberate and voluntary assumption
of risk-acts as a complete or partial defense in a products liability suit. The particulars of the contributory negligence defense
will, of course, vary from case to case.' For example, there is no
doubt that the standard of care expected of a licensed pilot is far
more exacting than that of the ordinary automobile driver. Yet,
I Holmes, The Path oj the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 474-75 (1897).
'See, e.g., for some of the writings on this question, Schwartz, Contributory
and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE L.J. 697 (1978); Twerski,
Many Faces of Misuse: An Inquiry Into the Emerging Doctrine of Comparative
Causation, 29 MERCER L. REv. 403 (1978).
3
While the issue is usually phrased in terms of plaintiff's contributory negligence, there is no reason why the courts could not, if they so chose, develop strict
defenses that are in all material respects analogous to the plaintiff's basic strict
liability cause of action. Indeed in cases involving harms inflicted upon strangers
(as opposed to users and consumers) I have advocated just such an approach.
See Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 3 J.
LEGAL STUD. 165, 174-85 (1974). For the development of this theme in connection with products liability actions, see text accompanying notes 25-29 infra.
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these differences in application can only be evaluated if there is
some judicial willingness to take the plaintiff's conduct into account
in determining the liability of a product manufacturer or supplier.
As of late, a number of courts have declined to recognize contributory negligence as a complete or partial defense." Likewise, a substantial and perhaps even greater number of courts have thought
the defense relevant in products liability actions much as in other
suits.'
In this paper I shall again address the question of the relevance
of the contributory negligence defense, whether as a complete or a
partial bar to plaintiff's recovery. In the first section I shall attempt
to explain why this defense was not an issue in the early products
liability actions prior to the publication of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in 1965. In the second section I shall argue that
contributory negligence should indeed be recognized as a defense,
whether comparative or contributory negligence is the rule within
a given jurisdiction. In the third section I shall argue for a general
rehabilitation of the older admiralty rule which called for an automatic division of all losses caused by the wrongful conduct of
both plaintiff and defendant. In the last section I shall discuss
the application of comparative negligence rules to actions involving multiple defendants, only some of whom may be products liability defendants.
Throughout this paper I shall consider the automobile as well
as the airplane. The conclusions reached in the one context are
clearly applicable to the other. Holmes was certainly correct about
chums, even if his treatment of the contributory negligence issue
is not beyond criticism.

I. BACKGROUND

AND HISTORY

In the formative years of products liability law little attention
was paid to affirmative defenses based upon plaintiff's conduct. At
4

See, e.g., Brown Mfg. Co. v. Williams, 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305

(1970); Rudisaile v. Hawk Aviation, Inc., PROD.

LB. REP.

(CCH)

5 8391

(N.M. 1979).
5
See, e.g., Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42
(Alaska 1976); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162,
144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978), discussed in text accompanying notes 19-29 intra.
For a collection of cases, see generally Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 240 (1972).
"See, e.g., Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 274 U.S. 65 (1927).
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first blush, this conclusion seems odd because the vast bulk of
products liability actions involved injuries to users or consumers.
In these cases the simple temporal progression of events makes the
plaintiff's conduct a link in the chain between original defect and
ultimate injury. How then can his conduct not be an issue? The
puzzle, however, is resolved by noting that the original products
liability actions were limited to cases in which a concealed defect
caused harm while the product was being used in the ordinary and
proper way.' The ordinary and proper use requirement (as part
of the basic cause of action) negated recovery whenever any plaintiff's misconduct was found. It also eliminated the need to attach
independent status to the defenses concerned with plaintiff's
conduct.
This basic account of the original products cause of action also
helps explain why assumption of risk, often disfavored in other
areas of the law, paradoxically emerged as the first of the products
liability defenses. Typical of the early cases that coupled assumption of risk with the narrow conception of product defect is Kassouf v. Lee Brothers, Inc.' In that case the plaintiff suffered severe
internal disorders when she ate a chocolate bar that contained
worms and maggots. The first bite tasted "funny," but only too
late did she discover its contamination. The defect, of course,
was latent and unknown; the consumption of the bar was normal
and proper. If the plaintiff had known of the defect the injury
would have been self-inflicted and the action properly barred.
The importance of knowledge and assumption of risk is highlighted,
moreover, if the plaintiff's action is regarded as based upon an
implied representation that the defendant's chocolate was fit for
human consumption.! Reliance is one of the essential elements of
7See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
The requirement is picked up in the definition of product defect in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A( comment g (1965).

'209 Cal. App. 2d 568, 26 Cal. Rptr. 276 (1962).
9 The misrepresentation theory in essence argues that what counts as a product
defect can only be determined by gathering from all possible sources-a product's
appearance, the manuals that instruct upon its use-the express and implied
statements by the defendant about the purposes to which the product can be put
and the limitations under which it ought to be operated. Some version of the

misrepresentation theory is found in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc.,
59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962)

where Justice

Traynor wrote:
In the present case, for example, plaintiff was able to plead and
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that claim, and such could not be established if the plaintiff had in
fact known of the chocolate's dangerous condition.
The real question is whether the facts in Kassouf admit a contributory negligence type defense. Here the court quite properly

held that they did not. The shared expectations of buyers and
sellers of food and drink are that the buyer is entitled to trust the
seller to package it correctly and need not make any independent
investigations of product fitness." The result reached depends solely
upon the sense of the bargain between the two parties, who, with
the passing of the privity limitation, are treated as if they had
prove an express warranty only because he read and relied on the
representations of the Shopsmith's ruggedness contained in the
manufacturer's brochure. Implicit in the machine's presence on the
market, however, was a representation that it would safely do the
jobs for which it was built. Under these circumstances, it should not
be controlling whether plaintiff selected the machine because of the
statements in the brochure, or because of the machine's own appearance of excellence that belied the defect lurking beneath the surface, or because he merely assumed that it would safely do the
jobs it was built to do.
For an exhaustive development of this theme, see Shapo, A Representational
Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability for
Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109 (1974).
10 The point about shared expectations and their relationship to entitlements
cannot be overstressed. In many modern decisions, the test of recovery is often
stated such that the defendant's product is defective if it does not protect the
plaintiff against any "reasonably foreseeable misuse" of the product in question.
See, e.g., Green v. Volkswagen of America, 485 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1973). Such
a formulation is instructive to the extent that it prevents the defendant from
arguing that his own subjective expectations of product use ought solely to determine what product misuse bars recovery and what does not. It is also useful
insofar as it suggests that the defendant's product must allow for some margin
of error in the plaintiff's use, as with a tire inflated to 28 pounds instead of 26
pounds per square inch. Yet it is wholly misguided if all it means is that the
defendant is responsible whenever there is foresight of possible error, for such
is always the case as manufacturers are well versed in the weird and unaccountable ways in which these products may be used and abused. The better cases
recognize that some limitation must be placed upon foreseeability and phrase it
in terms of the entitlement. "If the chattel is safe when sold, a manufacturer is
not required to anticipate or foresee that a user will alter its condition so as to
make it dangerous, or that he will continue to use it after it becomes dangerous
due to alteration in safety devices intended to protect the user from harm."
Westerberg v. School District No. 792, 276 Minn. 1, 10, 148 N.W.2d 312, 317
(1967) [emphasis added]. Note that the term "required" imports the sense of obligation. It is of course foreseeable, or even reasonably foreseeable, that users will
alter the products they acquire, or that they will fail to maintain them. Only if
"foreseeable" is interpreted in a normative and not a predictive fashion is it possible to reach the sensible result of the Westerberg decision.
See for an earlier expression of the same theme, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 395, comment j (1965).
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entered into a direct contract of sale. The very misrepresentation
theory that makes short shrift of cases like Kassouf also lends support for the treatment of plaintiff's conduct in Comment n to Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. This comment,
widely accepted as the basis for the modem law, reads in full as
follows:
Since the liability with which this section deals is not based upon
negligence of the seller, but is strict liability, the rule applied to
strict liability cases (see § 524) applies. Contributory negligence
of the plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence consists
merely in a failure to discover the defect in the product, or to guard
against the possibility of its existence. On the other hand the form
of contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense
under this section as in other cases of strict liability. If the user
or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and
nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product
and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery.
The comment, of vast importance to the modem law, serves as
the focal point for our subsequent analysis of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and product misuse.
II. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
A. In Modern Products Liability Actions
Kassouf and kindred cases illustrate the wisdom of rejecting the
contributory negligence defense for harms caused by latent defects
in food and drink. After publication of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, the central analytical problem relating to defenses was
whether to preserve Comment n in the face of the unprecedented
expansion of the basic defect concept." Most courts, not fully
11RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 402A, comment n (1965).
12The expansion involved the growth of both design defect and duty-to-warn
causes of action. Both of these existed in limited form before the Restatement.
For the earlier law on the question, see Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of
Design or Directions for Use of a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816 (1962). The Restatement provisions directed to design defects show a similarly guarded tone.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment h (1965): "A product
is not in a defective condition when it is safe for normal handling and consumption." For the narrow provisions on design defects, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 398 (1965); the same can be said of the warnings provision § 388,
comments g & h. The real case law expansion of the subject originally came
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cognizant of the revolution on the defect issue, either blandly
adopted the Restatement position or announced the even broader
proposition that all contributory negligence defenses were incompatible with the strict liability theories of Restatement Section
402A. These extensions are misconceived. Kassouf does not rest
upon the immateriality of contributory negligence to products
liability causes of action; it rests instead upon the narrower proposition that in this particular context the shared expectations are

that this consumer has no duty to seek out product defects. Change
the product or the circumstances under which it is distributed,
and the web of obligations that governs its use will change as well.
While Comment n reads as though it were a first principle of tort
law, it should be construed as a statement of the implied terms of a
bargain about a narrow, if important, class of products. Food and
drink, to which the early versions of Section 402A were in fact
limited, conjure very different expectations than do airplanes,
machine tools or automobiles."3
The pressure that the broad definition of defect places upon the
rules for plaintiffs conduct is well revealed by Melia v. Ford Motor
Co. " The decedent was killed in an intersection collision when she
was thrown out of her car through the unlocked door on the driver's
side. The plaintiff contended that the door was defective in design
in that it was not fail-safe against certain horizontal forces that
could open it while shut but unlocked. This question of design
defect was difficult and controversial, and the dissenting judge
thought the plaintiff's case should not even reach the jury. At issue
were three facets of the plaintiff's conduct: 1) she entered the
intersection against the red light; 2) she left her door unlocked;
and 3) she had not buckled her seat belt. By a divided vote the
through the expansion of negligence principles for design defects. See, e.g., Davis,
v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc. 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968); Larsen v. General
Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2
Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970). For my criticism of these
developments, see Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground,
56 N.C. L. REV. 643, 648-54 (1978).
13
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1961), which

was limited to food products, and RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS (Tent.
Draft No. 7, 1962), which was extended to products intended for "intimate body
use." The development of the case law within the area was so fast on the strict
liability question that by 1965 the section was extended to cover all products.
14 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976).
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court held, on its view of Nebraska law, that these issues were of
no concern in a products liability action, citing Restatement Comment n in support of that position." In the absence of plaintiff's
knowledge of the particular defects in the door-locking mechanism,
the Comment n defense was not established.
Again the court flounders on the issue of shared expectations.
The elimination of the privity requirement forces the court to
treat the parties as immediate buyer to immediate seller. It staggers
the imagination to assume that any implicit agreement between
them contemplated that the buyer could drive as he pleased, thereby exposing the defendant to costly and uncertain litigation. Simply
because the plaintiff in Kassouf did not have to pick her way
through a wormy bar of chocolate does not mean that the decedent
in Melia could drive like a fool. Knowledge that the chocolate has
turned in one case may be a precondition for intelligent action by
the user of the product, but knowledge of a minute design defect
in a car door is not required in order to make safe driving necessary. Running red lights is in violation of statute, regardless of
the condition of the automobile; it is not wrongful or risky solely
because of an alleged design defect. Wearing seat belts and locking
doors are common precautions that protect against a host of injuries; the decedent's was but one. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. evokes the image of a plaintiff "powerless" to protect
himself against an array of awesome and unknown hazards." Its
message should be established in each individual case. The plaintiff's
conduct in Melia barred her action against the driver of the other
'5 Melia

v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976). The Nebraska

statute on the subject involves a slight-gross rule whereby the comparative
approach is invoked when the plaintiff's negligence is "slight" and the defendant's

negligence, in comparison with it, is "gross". NEB. REV. STAT. S 25-1151 (1975).
16"The purpose of [strict] liability is to insure that the costs of injuries re-

sulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such
products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless
to protect themselves." Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 21,

377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962). Note the quotation does make
some sense where the cause of action is confined, as it was in Greenman, to
products known by the manufacturer "to be used without inspection for defects,"
and to plaintiffs who use the product "in the way in which it was intended to

be used." The argument is far weaker when extended to the broader accounts
of defect that have emerged since the publication of the Restatement in 1965.
See, for further critique, Epstein, Products Liability, supra note 12, 56 N.C. L.
REV. at 658-662.
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car." It is difficult to see why a defense of contributory negligence,
clearly applicable in the one context, should not be applicable to
the other.
The same set of principles has especial relevance in connection
with aviation accidents, where contributory negligence in products
cases has been greeted with the same chilly reception. In Rudisaile
v. Hawk Aviation, Inc.," the New Mexico court allowed the plaintiff to recover when her husband, a qualified pilot, crashed after
taking off in a Piper Cherokee 140 E. The plane had been drained
mistakenly of all its oil before flight, and it had not been replaced.
The decedent did not undertake the customary preflight check of
the aircraft before he took off. Here there is no question but that
the defendant's conduct is inexcusable; yet the same can be said
about the plaintiff's. If the plane had crashed into a farmhouse, the
decedent's estate would have been held jointly responsible with
the defendant, precisely because the decedent's duty was so clear.
Given this web of shared expectations within a highly structured
institutional framework, there is no reason why the plaintiff's contributory negligence should not be regarded as a defense, simply
because his action is brought under a products liability theory.
Melia and Rudisaile represent one side of an issue on which
legal opinion is divided. In a stunning reversal, the California
Supreme Court, long a leader in the expansion of products liability, adopted comparative negligence type principles by a four
to three vote in Daly v. General Motors Corp." The matter is one
on which present division of opinion invites a closer examination
of the arguments both for and against the contributory negligence
defense. The case for accepting some form of contributory negligence is best made by looking at the reasons that are used for its
rejection. These are clearly expressed in the impassioned dissent
of Justice Mosk in Daly:
This court has emphasized over and over again that strict
products liability is an independent tort species wholly distinct
from contract warranties ... and from negligence .... Indeed, in
Cronin we stressed that 'the very purpose of our pioneering efforts
'rMelia v. Svoboda, 191 Neb. 150, 214 N.W.2d 476 (1974).
"Rudisaile v. Hawk Aviation, Inc., PROD. LuB. REP. (CCH) 5 8391 (N.M.
1979).
9 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
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in this field was to relieve the plaintiff from problems of proof
inherent in pursuing negligence'.. . . And in Lugue v. McLean,
... this court unanimously declared that 'contributory negligence
does not bar recovery in a strict liability action'....
The bench and bar have abided by this elementary rule. They
have learned to avoid injecting negligence-whether of the defendant or the plaintiff-into a products liability case. And they
have understood the reason behind the distinction between negligence of any party and products liability....
Transferring the liability, or part of the liability, from the party
responsible for putting the article in the stream of commerce to
the consumer is precisely what the majority propose to do. They
do this by employing a euphemism: the victim's recovery is to be
'proportionately reduced.' The result, however delicately described,
is to dilute the defect of the article by elevating the conduct of the
wounded consumer to an issue of equal significance. We can be
as certain as tomorrow's daylight that every defendant charged
with marketing a defective product will hereafter assert that the
injured plaintiff did something, anything, that conceivably could
be deemed contributorily negligent: he drove the vehicle with a
defective steering mechanism 56 miles an hour instead of 54; or
he should have discovered a latent defect hidden in the machinery;
or perhaps he should not have succumbed to the salesman's persuasion and purchased the defective object in the first instance. I need
no crystal ball to foresee that the pleading of affirmative defenses
alleging contributory negligence-or the currently approved substitute terminology-will now become boilerplate."
B. FairnessArguments
Notwithstanding Justice Mosk's strong plea, the case for retaining contributory negligence remains secure. The point of departure is that courts have always treated the plaintiff's conduct as a
proper source of inquiry in all manner of torts actions, no matter
what the substance of the plaintiff's original cause of action. Not
only is contributory negligence regarded as an appropriate defense
in the typical highway accident case, but analogous defenses based
upon plaintiff's conduct are viable in traditional causes of action
based explicitly upon strict liability principles. Provocation is available as a defense in strict liability actions brought against the
owner of a wild animal.' The default of the plaintiff, however
2020

Cal. 3d at 758-60, 575 P.2d at 1182-83, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 400-01. (Cita-

tions and footnotes omitted.)
21 See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 523 (4th ed. 1971).
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defined, is a defense to actions patterned upon Rylands v. Fletcher"
for the escape of hazardous substances collected and stored on the
defendant's premises." Both contexts exhibit the same theme: the

plaintiff has engaged in conduct that would expose him to liability
if it injured a third person. There is no obvious reason, therefore,
why that conduct should be ignored because the plaintiff has helped

to injure himself instead. It is true that no person can sue himself;
nonetheless, his conduct can be taken into account in actions that

might otherwise promise full relief. The plaintiff who shares in the
production of his own harm can raise no obvious moral claim

against being required to shoulder a part of his own loss." Within
this framework, strict liability does not preclude an examination

into plaintiffs conduct; to the contrary, it invites it.
The basic equities of the situation are unchanged, moreover,
even when applied to products liability actions. Justice Mosk's
arguments of "symmetry", echoing those of Comment n, are de-

signed to give some a priori credibility to the argument that as
negligence is no part of the prima facie case, it should be no part
of the defense. A closer examination of the situation demonstrates,
however, that no single conceptual refinement can bear the im-

mense burden of undoing all contributory negligence defenses.
Justice Mosk is on sound ground when he notes the administrative
advantages of strict liability compared to negligence. ' He fails to

note, however, the small cash value of the doctrinal change, given
the extensive use of res ipsa loquitur, and the repeated insistence

on a very high standard of care. The tiny change brought about
- L. R. 3 H . L. 330 (1868).
2 Fletcher v. Rylands, L. R. 1 Ex. 267 (1866) aff'd in Rylands v. Fletcher,
L. R. 3 H . L. 330 (1868), where it is noted that the defendant "can excuse himself by showing that the escape was owing to the plaintiff's default."
24"It is unnecessary for us to catalogue the enormous amount of critical
comment that has been directed over the years against the 'all-or-nothing' approach of the doctrine of contributory negligence. The essence of that criticism
has been constant and clear: the doctrine is inequitable in its operation because
it fails to distribute responsibility in proportion to fault." Li v. Yellow Cab Co.,
13 Cal. 3d 804, 810, 532 P.2d 1226, 1230, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 860 (1975). The
classic article in favor of comparative negligence is still Prosser, Comparative
Negligence, 41 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1953). For a thoughtful modern defense of
the comparative negligence rule, see Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative
Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE L.J. 697 (1978). For criticism of the pure
comparative negligence approach adopted in Li, see notes 40-46 and accompanying text infra.
'See text accompanying note 20 supra.
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by the movement from negligence to strict liability as the basic
cause of action provides no warrant for a massive revolution in
the law of affirmative defenses. If anything, one expansion of
plaintiff's rights should caution against any further, independent
shift in the same direction. Courts that relax one requirementdefendant's negligence-in the plaintiff's case for administrative

ease need not dismantle another barrier to recovery--contributory
negligence-which has its own independent justifications.
Suppose for the moment, however, that the changes in the basic
cause of action should work symmetrical changes in the law of
affirmative defenses. What follows from this premise is not that
contributory negligence should be eliminated, but rather that it
should be strengthened." The point becomes clear by noting the
two separate elements which together form the contributory negligence defense. The first is the identification of the plaintiff's conduct which is in fact wrongful. The emphasis here is on the causal
element that contributes to the harm. In Melia, for example, that

conduct was the running of a red light. In Daly, it was speeding
down a freeway and crashing into a guardrail. The second element
-the negligence part of the defense-is the requirement that the

plaintiff who engaged in this wrongful conduct could have avoided
the harm by the exercise of reasonable care. Proof of this second
element is often trivial, but it is easy to give instances in which it
is not. The plaintiff in Melia, for example, might have run the
red light in order to escape from a gangster who had threatened
her life. The plaintiff in Daly might have hit the guardrail not be2 In the years up to the publication of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
the shift from negligence to strict liability was of little consequence for two
reasons. First, the courts were willing to use the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
aggressively to help the plaintiff establish negligence once the defect causing
damage was proved by other evidence. This was the position of the California
Supreme Court in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436
(1944), where Justice Traynor's opinion was only a concurrence. In addition,
courts had already decided that manufacturers and kindred parties, owing to
their special state of expertise, had to conform to a very high standard of care.
See, e.g., Hertzler v. Manshum, 228 Mich. 416, 200 N.W. 155 (1924). The
real revolution in products liability law came not with the move from negligence
to strict liability, but with the vast expansion of the defect concept in the years
following the publication of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965).
See notes 12-20 and accompanying text supra.
27I have made the parallel arguments with respect to the treatment of plaintiff's conduct in nuisance actions. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and
Its UtilitarianConstraints,8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 70-72 (1979).
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cause he was drunk, but in order to take a sick child to the hospital.
As contributory negligence involves both causation and a want
of reasonable care it then becomes crucial to ask what becomes of
each element in the application of symmetry principles to a strict
liability cause of action. The shift from negligence to strict liability
strengthens the prima facie case; it does not insulate the defendant
from all liability. So too a shift from contributory negligence to
contributory causation should make the plaintiff's conduct more
central to the disposition of the case. It should not insulate him
from all the consequences of his own conduct. Indeed once the
strengthened defense is incorporated into the law, the defendant
should be able to prevail by showing that the plaintiff did some
wrongful conduct, because the plaintiff's possible excuses will all
be irrelevant. Under symmetrical principles the plaintiff could not
use the gangster chase or the child's sickness as an excuse to escape
from the basic defense, which now assumes broader proportions
than before.
The basic point is unchanged even if Justice Mosk was right in
dwelling on the administrative workability of the defense. The
defendant has little or no access to the information about the
plaintiff's conduct. The very same problem that motivated the
shift to strict liability in dealing with the defendant's conduct works
in favor of a shift from contributory causation in dealing with the
plaintiff's conduct. "Symmetry" then leads to the elimination of
negligence from the affirmative defenses, but not to the elimination
of affirmative defenses from the entire lawsuit.
The real question in this entire area, however, is not what symmetry does, but whether there should be any need to satisfy symmetry constraints at all. The crucial point in products liability actions, at least those involving users and consumers of products, is
that there is no initial symmetry between the roles of the two
parties. Thus, there is no reason to assume that the standards of
conduct applicable to the one must perforce be applicable to the
other. In the simple food case it is, of course, appropriate to bar
the plaintiff only where there is knowledge of the contaminated
condition of the product about to be consumed." Yet reasons of
2So Justice Mosk seems to agree. "If a consumer elects to use a product
patently defective when other alternatives are available, or to use a product in
a manner clearly not intended or foreseeable, he assumes the risk inherent in
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symmetry do not allow the plaintiff recovery only when the defendant's employees also had actual knowledge of the particular

defect that caused the harm. The same principles apply to other
cases. The web of shared expectations may not require the injured
party to reach the level of performance expected of a manufacturer. They may make allowances for workers who do not follow
every petty workplace rule, every idle statutory regulation, every
detailed manufacturer's instruction, no matter how unwise or uncertain. Yet these problems can be handled as in other contexts:
thus the contributory negligence provisions of the Restatement2

set out a workable set of excuses that can override the contributory
negligence defense. They do not, by any stretch of the imagination,
require the abandonment of the defense in its entirety. Traditional
tort principles require that some plaintiff's conduct be excused, and
they allow a wide variation in the exact standards for such excusable conduct.
Before turning to other aspects of Justice Mosk's opinion, it is
useful to consider another conceptual rationale that from time to

time has been used to justify the abrogation of contributory negligence in product liability cases: the duty of the defendant is to
guard the plaintiff against his own negligence, which cannot, as

if by definition, serve as an independent affirmative defense. The
his improper utilization and should not be heard to complain about the condition
of the object." Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 763, 575 P.2d 1162,
1185, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 403 (1978). Although the remark was made in connection with a power saw used to trim fingernails, it applies equally well to the food
cases.
29RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS § 288A (1965) sets out the plaintiff's
excuses for his breach of statutory obligation as follows:
(1) An excused violation of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation is not negligence.
(2) Unless the enactment or regulation is construed not to permit
such excuse, its violation is excused when
(a) the violation is reasonable because of the actor's incapacity;
(b) he neither knows nor should know of the occasion for compliance;
(c) he is unable after reasonable diligence or care to comply;
(d) he is confronted by an emergency not due to his own misconduct;
(e) compliance would involve a greater risk of harm to the actor
or to others.
Objection can be taken to the details of this formulation, yet, notwithstanding,
there is no reason why these excuses cannot be applied with equal force to
the plaintiff's conduct in a products liability situation, whether in a regime of
comparative or contributory negligence.
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basic argument was perhaps most forcefully set out by Justice
Proctor in Bexiga v. Havir Manufacturing Corp.' In that case,
the plaintiff, an eighteen-year-old youth on his first day of work,
had his hand caught and smashed in a punch press manufactured
by the defendant. The press was equipped with a foot treadle and
was without any special hand safety guards. The court first decided that the plaintiff could make out a design defect case even
though the defendant had followed the standard industry practice
that called for the press purchaser to install whatever safety devices it regarded as suitable for its own particular end use. It then
turned to the contributory negligence defense, which it rejected in
the following words:
The asserted negligence of plaintiff-placing his hand under the
ram while at the same time depressing the foot pedal-was the
very eventuality the safety devices were designed to guard against.
It would be anomalous to hold that defendant has a duty to install
safety devices but that a breach of that duty results in no liability
for the very injury that duty was meant to protect against .... We
hold that under the facts presented ... the defense of contributory
negligence is unavailable.3
This passage is subject to two independent lines of criticism.
First, the soundness of its conclusion rests upon the soundness of its
premise. If the defendant's "duty" in design defect cases requires the
protection of the plaintiff from all foreseeable misuses, then it is
sensible to maintain that such misconduct by the plaintiff ought
not to eliminate that responsibility by the back door. Narrower
standards of design defects, however, are not only possible, but
preferable. When attention shifts to "normal and proper use," or
to the commands of statute or common practice, the particular
conclusion reached in Bexiga fails along with its underlying premise. To the extent that defendant is not obliged to protect the plaintiff against his own misconduct or error, contributory negligence
remains a defense. This assumes, of course, that the plaintiff has
already surmounted the defect hurdle by showing, for instance,
that the defendant's machine was not safe in ordinary use. As both
the defendant's product and the plaintiff's conduct jointly cause
the plaintiff's injury, it becomes only appropriate to apportion the
- 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972).
3 60 N.J. 402, 412, 290 A.2d 281, 286 (1972).
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losses between the parties under the rules applicable to other cases
of joint responsibility.
The second criticism quickly follows from the first. One difficulty
with the opinion in Bexiga (as the last sentence quoted intimates)
is that it does not specify the scope of its own application. Ostensibly, the opinion is limited to design defect cases, but it is difficult to see how such a limitation can in fact be defended. Thus,
under the argument in Bexiga, what reply can be made to the
plaintiff in an ordinary traffic accident who says that his misconduct
should be excused because the defendant was required to follow
the rules of the road in order to protect those (if it matters, foreseeable) persons who might be driving in violation of the highway
rules? All the elements of the Bexiga rule are there. The plaintiff's
conduct is clearly substandard; yet, for that reason alone it is not
unforeseeable. With negligence as a bar, a defendant's verdict will
negate this duty to this plaintiff, if not to others. Notwithstanding,
the contributory negligence rule persists. The defendant's liability
in highway accidents may be conditioned upon the plaintiff's normal and proper driving, even when the defendant himself has
violated a legal norm. The same conclusion is no less "anomalous"
in products liability contexts.
All this is not to say that a total bar is itself just. Comparative
negligence (or responsibility) may be in order for all products,
actions. The scope of these principles will be discussed in greater
detail later, but one point is clear now: if the plaintiff's recovery
in cases like Bexiga is not barred but reduced, then all mention of
legal anomaly is misplaced. The defendant properly charged with
a design defect-even by today's capacious standards-can never
escape all liability once causal connection is established. The alleged
duty, far from being nullified, remains the source of substantial liability. The arguments of Justice Proctor fare no better in the end
than those of Justice Mosk. There is simply no pure conceptual
argument that justifies the total abrogation of contributory negligence in products liability actions.
C. Incentive Arguments
In the course of his dissent in Daly, Justice Mosk also laid great
stress upon the undesirable incentive effects that would be fostered
by an acceptance of the contributory negligence defense in liability
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actions."' Although the point must be made with some caution, it
seems in broad outline that the incentive arguments do more to
support than undermine that defense. The customary justification
for contributory negligence is, of course, that it imposes upon the
plaintiff those incentives that encourage cost effective measures
that help prevent his own injuries. The usual response to this argument is that a plaintiff, faced with the possibility of death or serious
injuries, need not be subjected to legal sanctions in order to compel
his cooperation in the loss control process. Instead, the argument
continues, the powerful incentives should be directed towards the
defendant, especially in the products liability context. Defendants
are typically business firms, often large, that can and do make the
appropriate cost calculations. They can "design out" product error
and protect the plaintiff against the hazards of systematic neglect.
Plaintiffs are isolated individuals who may not even know the
applicable rules governing their own conduct. It is idle to expect
them to respond to the indirect pressure created by the manipulation of the liability rules. To the extent that contributory negligence
either reduces or eliminates the incentives created by the prima
facie case, the argument continues, the law cuts back on one of
its own essential missions, that of putting the liability upon the
parties best able to make and act upon the appropriate cost benefit
analysis.' This argument, it should be stressed, is not wholly without force, yet it is subject to a number of important caveats.
First, there is a danger that the argument could prove too much.
Airplane pilots and automobile drivers clearly risk harm to themselves when they inflict harm upon innocent third parties. Yet no
one would suggest that we remove all tort sanctions against them
because of the dangers they face in their own activities. Why then
should defenses based upon plaintiff's conduct be removed simply
because the plaintiff exposes himself to injury?
Second, there is good reason to believe that many individuals
will respond to the additional incentives even if faced with the
possibility of personal loss. They will, in all likelihood, respond to
such incentives when faced solely with property damage, especially
3"See Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal,

87 YALE L.J. 697, 703-21 (1978), for a discussion of the basic issues in this
section.
'For a more general development of this theme, see Calabresi & Hirschoff,
Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972).
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if tort awards are fixed to make them indifferent between the property destroyed and the cash received on account of its destruction.
Likewise, individuals may well respond to legal incentives even
where life and limb are placed in peril. The reduction of the speed
limits to fifty-five miles an hour is in all likelihood responsible for
the sharpest drop in accident rates in the past thirty years, ' and
this is an era featuring both the extensive safety regulations under
the National Highway Safety Act and the well-nigh universal
adoption of the crashworthiness doctrine. If individual drivers were
held adequately in check by fear for their own lives, then it would
be ironic to assume that the threat of a small fine, coupled with a
possible increase in insurance rates, or the suspension of a license
would have much influence upon their behavior. Yet the decline
in death rates suggests that the marginal contribution of these
additional sanctions has indeed had that effect. What is true of
these statutory sanctions may well be true of the private law sanctions as well. Individual parties need not know the refinements of
the tort law in order to respond to the milieu that it creates; it is
quite sufficient that they know as a crude truth that they will lose
all or most of their recovery if they work like fools in the shop or
drive like hot-rodders on the highway. The sanctions involved may
be contingent in impact and uncertain in extent, but unless all
individuals are oblivious to all probabilistic facts, it seems likely that
the presence of contributory negligence defenses will have some
favorable influence upon their conduct, and through it upon the
accident rates. Ignorance is not a fixed fact of nature. If the de-1 The exact effects of the speed limit are difficult to determine because of
the wide range of factors that influence the levels of accidents, including amongst

others, the number of miles driven, the conditions of the roads, the use of
alcohol and the average age of the driving population. Yet it seems clear that the
speed limit, especially when enforced, is a dominant factor. Thus Secretary
Coleman of the Department of Transportation has reported:
We have found that no accurate estimate can be made on the

overall safety impact of the 55 mile-per-hour speed limit, but there
should be high confidence that a large portion of the reduction in
fatalities is due to the direct or indirect benefits of the new 55
mile-per-hour speed limit.
D.O.T. Appropriation Hearings, p. 68, Indeed major reductions in injuries and
fatalities were reported between 1973 and 1974 which are in all likelihood
attributable to the reduction in the speed limit.
"The flouting of the 55-mile-per-hour speed limit correlates almost exactly
to the rising death rate ...

."

Chicago Tribune, April 29, 1979, § 7, at 3, col. 1-2.

(quoting Lt. Robert Brandt, a spokesman for the Illinois State Police).
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fense does control, the individuals ignorant of it today will surely
be informed of it tomorrow, whether it be by a public service announcement about highway safety or from an insistent warning by
a union shop representative.'
Third, the conduct of private parties (to the extent that it has
not been rendered futile by judicial regulation) also points to the
importance of the contributory negligence defense in products
liability actions brought by product users and consumers. It is
commonly accepted (especially by critics of the marketplace)
that, in the absence of judicial regulation, most manufacturers
would require, and most consumers would accept, rules that barred
misbehaving plaintiffs. As with virtually all terms between buyer
and seller, there is every reason to believe that the durable distribution of risks between manufacturers and their customers represents the efficient distribution of risks between the two parties. 8
These restrictions upon recovery might be motivated in part by
a commendable desire to reduce the administrative costs associated
with accidents. They can also be interpreted as a market judgment
that the incentives of a contributory negligence defense are worth
preserving. The ultimate economic question is, of course, whether
the incentives that are removed from the defendant are replaced
by equal or more insistent incentives upon the plaintiff. While the
result may vary from case to case and product to product, the perceived behavior of the interested parties creates a strong presumption that the incentive properties of affirmative defenses are indeed
preferable to those under some alternative regime.
Fourth, the practical aspects of products liability litigation point
in the same direction as the theory. The distinctive feature of these
products liability actions is that the plaintiff is uniquely in the
3 For

a very skeptical account of the safety benefits of direct safety regula-

tion, see Pelzman, The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulations, 83 J. POLMCAL

EcoN. 677 (1975) which, while concerned with the direct control over safety
under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, could be
extended to various tort doctrines, e.g., crashworthiness, which are designed to
achieve the same effect. In essence Pelzman's argument is that any benefits of
increased safety regulation may be offset as consumers affected by such regulation
change their primary conduct in ways that increase the likelihood of accidents,
e.g., by traveling at greater speeds in the knowledge that they are less likely to
be hurt by an accident because of improved roll-bars.
I I develop this theme in Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal,
18 J. L. & ECON. 293 (1975).
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better position to prevent the harm. 7 He typically has possession
and control over the product at the time of its use and has information about the immediate environment in which it operates. The
traditional negligence law allows these spatial and temporal priorities to work for the plaintiff when the defendant had "the last clear
chance" to prevent harm. Recognition of the contributory negligence defense in products cases could also show the importance
of the "proximate" in theories of proximate cause and ultimate
tort liability in yet another context. The operator or user of a
product, as in Melia, certainly had clear and effective means to
avoid the harms in question. Incentives directed towards the elimination of their foolish conduct should not be dismissed as unnecessary or unworkable, even in a regime that seeks to create strong
incentives upon manufacturers.
Fifth, the implied premise of this discussion of contributory
negligence is that the rest of products liability law has already set
into motion a set of ideal incentives for the control and regulation
of the defendant's conduct, such that the recognition of any form
of contributory negligence can only "dilute" the incentives placed
upon the manufacturer "by elevating the conduct of the wounded
consumer to equal significance." 8 Yet, all is not well in the basic
products liability cause of action, particularly with cases involving challenges to product warnings and design.' If the incentives
created in these areas are indeed both perverse and undesirable,
then a strong set of contributory negligence defenses has a desirable
tendency to correct the imperfections that have crept into other
portions of the law. The offset will be far from perfect because the
contributory negligence defense will apply with equal force to the
strongest construction defect case and the weakest design defect
case. The guess here is that the contributory negligence defense is
of greatest importance where a product is alleged defective because
of its inability to prevent injuries resulting from "foreseeable mis37 The exceptions to this generalization apply mainly in cases of latent defects
not detectable in ordinary use, which are exactly the cases to which the con-

tributory negligence defense would not apply. See note 7 and accompanying text
supra.
"'Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 759, 575 P.2d 1162, 1183,

144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 401 (1978).
'9 See generally, Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1973).
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use" or "open and obvious" defects. As these cases tend to give
rise to the most strained interpretation of the defect question, it
seems reasonable to believe that the contributory negligence defense will come into play precisely in those cases in which it is
most needed.
The incentive arguments of Justice Mosk, then, are not without
their strength, but the arguments that can be marshalled on the
other side seem to have greater merit. As is so often the case with
incentive arguments, the results are inconclusive without empirical
evidence, and the empirical evidence that is required is, only because of the difficulty of the subject matter, never forthcoming.
The original fairness arguments, as reinforced in this section, still
control.
I. AUTOMATIC

APPORTIONMENT

Once it is established that the wrongful conduct (be it causation or negligence) of the plaintiff and defendant have jointly
brought about the harm in question, the issue is how to apportion
loss between them. Recent tort law has in one of its more startling
innovations transformed contributory negligence from a complete
bar to the source of reduction in the plaintiff's recovery: i.e., comparative negligence. The earlier law regarded the administrative
complications of apportioning losses as so great that courts should
not burden their own facilities to aid a plaintiff who, after all, was
as responsible for his own harms as the defendant."0 The modern
position on the issue downplays these administrative complications
and assumes, if only as a matter of basic fairness, that an apportionment of damages is the legal corollary of joint causation. The
tension between the two views of negligence runs the full length
and breadth of the tort law, and it clearly applies to the products
liability actions that involve the ordinary forms of contributory
negligence. What should be done?
As an initial point, the debate over apportionment in products
liability cases is limited by the conclusions reached in other tort
contexts. Consider, for example, an action brought against both the
operator of a heavy truck and its manufacturer. Where the matter

I For
GENCE

a statement of this view, see C. F.
11-12 (1st ed. 1885).

BEACH, JR., CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
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concerns the conduct of the injured plaintiff, it seems difficult and
unwise to have one rule for the operator and quite another for the
manufacturer. This distinction looks unprincipled, and the use of
separate rules can only complicate whatever adjustments amongst
defendants are appropriate by way of contribution and indemnity.
Products liability raises no distinctive apportionment issues.
The consensus of opinion today is that the "pure form" of comparative negligence best adjusts the competing equities between
plaintiffs and defendants. The great advantage of this position is
that it removes the possibility that any small shifts in the relative
responsibility between plaintiff and defendant will have vast consequences upon the distribution of losses between them. A form of
comparative negligence that permits the plaintiff to recover when
found 'forty-nine' percent negligent, but that bars recovery at 'fifty'
percent negligence places an incredible strain upon the legal system. The slightest re-evaluation of the negligence of either party

can result in enormous shifts in the amount of the award.' The
pure comparative negligence system eliminates any sharp discontinuity at the margin. In a $100,000 case, the plaintiff who is fiftyone percent negligent recovers $49,000. A two percent swing in
negligence cannot result in a $100,000 swing in potential recovery.
In spite of this desirable characteristic, there are still strong
objections to the pure comparative negligence system, both generally and in products liability contexts. In products cases it is

often said that the formula will not work because it is impossible
to compare the negligence of the plaintiff with the "strict" wrong
of the defendant.' The argument is of little merit, and indeed leads
"'The problems here are not dissimilar from those which involve the use of
any balancing test to determine either negligence (as in traditional tort actions)
or product defect (as in modern design defect cases). Whenever a welter of
factors are combined in order to resolve a single question of fact, a slight variation
in the value of one variable can result in an all-or-nothing change on the issue of
liability. The Learned Hand formula for negligence provides that a defendant
should be found negligent if the costs of precaution are less than a number equal
to the plaintiff's damages multiplied by the probability of their occurrence.
Note its all-or-nothing characteristics. If the cost of precautions are set at $100
and the probability of accident at 1%, does it make sense to call the defendant
negligent if the damages are $10,001 but not if they are $9,999? Indeed, this
instability at the margins is one of the features of the classical negligence rule
that argue for its rejection. See Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD. 151, 152-60 (1973).
42See, e.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162,
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to a delicious irony. The plaintiff brings a strict liability action to
which there is a possible contributory negligence defense. Should
the law insist upon a rule that induces the defendant, perhaps
under the banner of negligence per se, to insist upon his own
negligence in order to reduce the damages that must be paid the
plaintiff? Should the law tolerate a distinction whereby the defense
is inapplicable to strict liability actions for want of proper warnings or design, but not to their rough negligence equivalents that
so often appear in the reports? Even if we pass these points aside,
the difficulties of comparison between plaintiff's and defendant's
wrongs persist even in a system of pure negligence or pure strict
liability, i.e., comparative responsibility. The plaintiff may bring
an action for defective design and be met with the failure to follow
customary work rules. The defendant may be sued on a construction
defect theory, to which a defense of statutory breach or unreasonable assumption of risk is raised. The cases are shot through with
such incommensurables, as Melia itself indicates.' The marriage
of contributory negligence and strict liability adds another layer
of confusion to the basic inquiry, but the system itself is beset with
difficulties that antedate and overwhelm this "apples and oranges"
objection.
The real source of difficulty arises even if we assume that the
same standard of judgment may be brought to bear on both plaintiff's and defendant's conduct. The basic inquiry is, how does one
generate any set of percentages about plaintiff's and defendant's
responsibility from the raw data about their conduct, or their
product? Whether we speak of negligence or strict liability, both
parties are partly responsible for the loss in question. The defendant
could not have harmed the plaintiff without the plaintiff's own
cooperation; the plaintiff would not be harmed if the defendant's
product was free of defect. Within this framework there is nothing
about the particular pattern of factual information, even if perfectly known, that demands any unique set of percentages in any
given case. All allocation of responsibility between the two parties
is arbitrary, whether by a judge or by jury, whether by hunch or
by computer. The claims of individual fairness are ill-served by
144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978) (Jefferson, J. concurring and dissenting; Mosk, J.
dissenting).
'Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976).
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the pretense that legal principles have a degree of precision that
they do not in fact possess. The economic incentives upon the parties are hardly sharpened by any shift from a 50-50 to a 60-40
split. The necessary case by case determinations are both expensive and pointless. They may flatter the legal mind, but they do
not advance the orderly administration of justice. If individual
determinations must fail, then it is surely best to have a collective
decision about the distribution of loss that extends to all cases
of joint responsibility. The only way that such a collective decision
can be made is by a fixed judicial or legislative rule that is less
concerned with the false pursuit of perfect equity in the individual
case and more concerned with the reduction of administrative
costs and the introduction of a measure of certainty and predictability into the system.
In this connection, the best approach is still that of the older
admiralty cases, however great their disrepute today." Once it is
settled that certain harms are jointly caused by two parties, then
the loss should be apportioned between them under some fixed
formula, probably one that reduces recovery for the jointly caused
harms by, for example, 50 percent. The number is by no means
perfect, but nothing about the facts of any particular case allows
further principled refinements. United States v. Reliable Transfer
Co.,' the very case which overturned the old admiralty rule, involved a ship grounding that occurred when the captain tried improperly to turn a vessel around in a narrow waterway after the
Coast Guard had failed to mark the correct channel with the
proper light buoy. The traditional rule required a 50-50 split,
but only for those losses which could have been avoided by proper
navigation and the proper light buoys. The court approved a
division of 75-25 in favor of the Coast Guard, presumably under the theory that one party was "more" actively negligent
than the other. In this situation, however, the relative degrees
of the two negligences escape calculation. There is not only the
long tradition that negligence never functions as a matter of de"For the American judicial origins of the rule, see The Schooner Catharine
v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1854). The rule was extensively criticized
in G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 402-04 (2d ed. 1975).
-421

U.S. 397 (1975).
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gree;" there is also the admitted fact that if either party alone had
caused the loss, its negligence, whether slight or great, would
fasten the whole loss upon it. If the conduct of each party can hold
it accountable for the full loss, then it can do so for any portion
of it.
The artificiality of the Reliable Transfer solution of pure apportionment is heightened, moreover, when we consider the parallel apportionment problems in products liability cases. The
negligence of the plaintiff is always closer to the injury than the
wrong of defendant. The plaintiff's wrong is often active in nature,
while the defendant's wrongful conduct may be only the failure to
protect the plaintiff from himself. Yet cases may assign the greater
weight of the loss to the defendant, on what must often be implicit
"deep pocket" grounds. The possibilities for abuse are clearly evident in circumstances in which an honest person could not decide upon the proper division of losses with the criteria available
for judgment. Flexible percentages, even if not misused, do not help
one whit. The old contributory rule was unjust, if at all, only because of its "all or nothing" character. The pure comparative negligence rule avoids the all or nothing approach, but only at the cost
of a ruinous excursion into the never-never land of flexible percentages. The fixed apportionment rule escapes the vice of the old
contributory negligence rule, while avoiding the routine, but fruitless, pursuit for illusory percentages. The rejection of the absolute
bar of contributory negligence leads not to pure comparative negligence, but to automatic division. Those who think that further
refinement is possible have not indicated how it can be achieved.
lV. MULTIPLE PARTIES

The major problem in this area does not arise in two party suits,
but in those frequent cases in which the injured party joins several
defendants, each of which is arguably partially responsible for the
loss. These cases create no particular problem under a contributory
negligence rule because the absolute bar against the plaintiff oper4 Thus the famous bon mot of Baron Rolfe that gross negligence was the
same thing as ordinary negligence "with the addition of a vituperative epithet."
Wilson v. Brett, 152 Eng. Rep. 737 (1843). The point may well be wrong with
respect to this distinction. Yet, even if we can make functional the difference
between ordinary and gross negligence, it by no means follows that we can
measure the percentages of negligence causally responsible for some given harm.
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ates for the benefit of each separate defendant. Matters are not so
simple, however, under an automatic apportionment rule, for the
question arises as to what principles should guide the automatic
division amongst three or more parties.
The most cautious would apply the rules of automatic apportionment amongst the defendants as a class, leaving the determination
of the plaintiff's percentage of the total loss to the flexible percentages in use today. Yet such a proposal is inconsistent with
the notion of fixed percentages in the two party case; and, it creates
an enormous discontinuity if a 50-50 division is imposed in two
party cases while flexible percentages are applicable to plaintiff's
conduct in multiple party cases. The adding or dismissing of a
party from litigation could have enormous strategic consequences
that bear no relationship to the merits of the claim against the
additional party."' As products liability actions often involve multiple party situations, the benefits of the automatic rule will be
severely circumscribed if limited only to two party cases.
Assuming that fixed rules are carried over to multiple party
cases, two possible rules of apportionment suggest themselves. By
the first, some fixed percentage of the loss will be kept upon the
plaintiff regardless of the number of defendants brought into the
case. The advantage of this rule is that it removes any incentive
from the plaintiff to increase the number of defendants in order to
decrease his portion of the load. Yet this advantage is illusory and
in any event appears to come at too high a cost. In the first place,
the rule in question could only work if those defendants sued by
the plaintiff were not allowed to bring further defendants into
the case, even in situations where these additional parties bore the
brunt of the responsibility. Even if this costly prohibition were
granted, however, nothing could prevent a defendant from persuading the plaintiff to bring direct actions against these parties,
especially if they, and not the original defendants, are solely responsible for the harm in question. A plaintiff will be faced with
extensive costs of suit no matter what the rule on multiple parties.
4 One way to escape this discontinuity is to apply the pure comparative
negligence rules to all cases between plaintiffs and defendants, and then to use
automatic apportionment among the defendants. Such a proposal in no way
reduces the recovery of the plaintiff, and benefits all defendants as a class by

reducing the administrative costs of defending a products liability suit.
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Artificial limitations on joinder seem both unwanted and unwarranted.
It seems, therefore, that the only possible rule is one that uniformly divides the loss by the number of responsible parties to
the case. Where there are "n" parties, the plaintiff must keep 1 /nth
of the loss. To this rule there should be added an immediate
qualification or an unfortunate "double counting" will arise if
certain defendants are treated as separate entities in apportioning
loss. In the products liability context, it is often common for the
plaintiff to join both the manufacturer and retailer of a defective
product. There is little to commend a rule which drops the significance of plaintiff's misconduct from a half to a third solely
because of a redundant defendant, the retailer, who has in all likelihood an indemnity action against the manufacturer.n All those
parties who are held, whether directly or vicariously, for a single
product defect should be treated as one party for the purpose of
the rules. The division of responsibility amongst themselves for their
share will be determined as if they were the only defendants in the
case. Typically, therefore, the manufacturer will bear the full brunt
of the loss, and the retailer will have to step into his shoes only
if the manufacturer is insolvent or beyond the jurisdiction. The
use of these apportionment rules does not, of course, do anything
to abrogate the general rules on joint and several liability. If any
single defendant (or group of defendants) is unable to pay its portion of the loss, then it will be borne pro rata by all other responsible parties, including, of course, the plaintiff.
" The question of double counting was fairly addressed by the California
legislation on the subject, CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§875-879, which was gutted
by the California Supreme Court in American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior
Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978). Thus section
876(b) reads:
Where one or more persons are held liable solely for the tort of
one of them or of another, as in the case of the liability of a master
for the tort of his servant, they shall contribute a single pro rata
share, as to which there may be indemnity between them.
While the statute does not direct its attention to the products liability context,
the parallel between the master-servant case and the manufacturer-retailer case
holds except perhaps where the retailer takes an active part in the preparation
of the goods for sale. Indeed the argument for counting retailer and manufacturer
as a single party seems especially strong. The master in employment situations
has some direct contractual control over his servants, so that his liability, though
formerly vicarious, is often in fact based upon his primary conduct. Such is not
the case with retailer's liability for the manufacturer.
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The one remaining set of problems arises when the plaintiff
settles with one or more of the defendants in advance of the trial.
Upon plaintiff's recovery at trial, it is necessary to determine first,
the effect of the plaintiff's settlement upon the amount of recovery
against the remaining defendants, and second, the various rights
of indemnity and contribution between settling and non-settling
codefendants. On the first of these questions, it is possible to
adopt two courses of action. One approach is simply to treat the
plaintiff as though he has recovered his pro rata portion of the
damages from the settling defendant, no matter what the actual
level of settlement. ' A $100,000 case brought by a negligent
plaintiff against four defendants, would, with the automatic 20 percent set-off, yield $20,000 from each of three non-settling defendants, whether his settlement with the fourth defendant was for
$5,000 or $150,000. This rule has been condemned because it
allows the plaintiff to recover an amount in excess of his full injuries." Likewise, it abrogates, full joint and several liability where
the settling defendant escapes for less than his pro rata share. Yet,
as both double and partial recovery could occur by settlement
alone, it is by no means clear that the point is decisive.
The alternative rule reduces the amount of the damages owing
by the amount actually paid in settlement. It avoids the problem
of excessive or insufficient recovery, but it creates an incentive for
a plaintiff to accept an inferior settlement from one defendant in
order to finance suits against the others. The frequency of this
occurrence is, however, hard to predict. It is unlikely that a plaintiff will settle cheaply with one defendant against whom he has a
strong case in order to pursue the other dubious defendants into the
shades of night. In any event, it might well be possible for all defendants to mount a united front against the plaintiff, so that partial
settlements with single defendants may be difficult.
"9This equal distribution was indeed contemplated in CAL. CODE CIv.
PROC. § 876(a): "The pro rata share of each tort feasor judgment debtor shall
be determined by dividing the entire judgment equally among all of them."

The California Supreme Court argued that the introduction of pure comparative
negligence between plaintiff and defendant rendered the statute in effect obsolete.
The position could be reversed, for the statute sets a sensible model for automatic

proration amongst defendants that precludes the pure comparative negligence of
Li. It goes almost without saying that the rules of contribution amongst joint
tortfeasors are among the most shapeless of the common law.

11 Jamarillo v. State, 81 Cal. App. 3d 968, 146 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1978).
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The exact merits of the two alternative rules is quite difficult to
evaluate. On balance, however, it appears that a rule which reduces
recovery by a proportionate share is preferable to one that reduces
by the amount paid. Such rule in effect treats each separate defendant as independent of all others. A decision by one defendant to settle will, therefore, neither increase nor decrease the
exposure of other defendants. In this case, no plaintiff has an incentive to settle cheaply with any given defendant. The fact of
settlement can be introduced, it should be assumed, by other defendants in order to reduce their own proportion of the liability,
so the plaintiff cannot recoup his early losses from other defendants. By the same token, the independence of each defendant's
liability eliminates any need for allowing any actions between
settling and non-settling defendants. The non-settling defendant,
as is now the case," should in any event be prohibited from bringing suit against a settling defendant, for only then is it possible to
have any individual settlement before disposition of the entire case.
In addition, given that the exposure of the settling defendant does
nothing to decrease the exposure of the remaining defendants, the
settling defendant should have no action against the non-settling
defendant who escapes for lesser sums. There are doubtless unforeseen complications, e.g., what happens if the injuries become
more or less severe after the settlement, that will cause difficulties
in the administration of any particular rule. These may tip the
balance in favor of a rule that sets off only amounts paid from
other awards. These complications, however, do not count as an
argument against automatic apportionment in multiple party cases,
as they will arise with ever greater fierceness under a pure comparative negligence system. Suits amongst codefendants (especially
under pure comparative principles) have little internal structure
or logic; the fewer of them that are seen, the better.
CONCLUSION

The advent of comparative negligence has generally been hailed
as a great advance in the operation of the tort law, both in ordinary negligence actions and in products liability suits. There is, to
51Such indeed was required by the California statute, CAL. CODE CiV. PROC.

§ 877(b).
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be sure, much to be said in favor of a system that splits the loss
where the best of substantive theories cannot single out any given
actor as "the" wrongdoer for the harm in question. Yet, it is a
mistake to conclude that the organization of this branch of the
law is completed with the acceptance of this single moral insight.
The inauguration of a new system of liability carries with it a
whole host of subsidiary questions that cannot be answered solely
by the choice of a major premise. In particular, a regime of comparative negligence-or if it matters, comparative responsibilityrequires some technique of apportionment amongst the various
parties to the law suit. The moral theory that calls for that apportionment cannot, however, accomplish it in any given way. It seems,
therefore, better to have a fixed set of rules, be they of judicial or
legislative origin, which do the apportionment after the basic
principles of tort liability determine the parties amongst whom
apportionment should take place. The dominant judicial trend,
however, both in products liability actions, and in other areas,
has gone quite the other way. The courts have left it largely to
juries to decide how much of the loss should be fastened upon each
party. In so doing they have not advanced the moving ethical ideal
of the comparative negligence law. They have only served to make
the administration of tort law generally, and products liability law
in particular, more expensive and less predictable.

